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Volume 35, Issue 3, Summer 2012
1. Title: Fiscal Policy in an Era of Austerity
Authors: Schizer, David M.
Abstract: We face a time of stagnant economic growth, severe unemployment, massive budget deficits, and an increasingly competitive global economy. These daunting challenges are the legacy of a number of unwise policy decisions in both the public and private sectors. Although the good news is that unsound policies can be changed, the bad news is that no single step will do the trick. It is a challenge to rely on monetary policy when interest rates are near zero. There also is uncertainty and a heated debate among economists about the effectiveness of a Keynesian stimulus. One thing we know is that a stimulus is quite difficult to execute effectively. For example, it is a challenge to identify shovel ready projects that contribute to long-term economic growth, particularly on short notice. There is no uncertainty, though, about the need to address a broad range of specific problems contributing to our economic woes. We have to promote economic growth and fiscal stability over the long term. To do so, we should reform our housing and mortgage markets, our entitlement programs, our tax code, and much more. A short Article for a special issue cannot delineate all the challenges Congress is facing or provide definitive guidance about how to address them. As an illustrative example, this Article emphasizes the perils of maintaining the highest corporate tax rate in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in a competitive global economy. Cutting our corporate tax rate would encourage businesses to invest and hire more employees, while also reducing incentives to engage in wasteful tax planning and to shift taxable income and jobs overseas. In addition to the problems with our substantive law, we also face problems of process that undercut our government's effectiveness. An important (and familiar) one is that politicians are consistently tempted to accommodate organized interest groups, especially if the costs of these favors can be quietly passed on to the general public. This is all the more true if special interest deals can be financed with deficit spending, so that the bill will not come due until long after our current political leaders have retired. Various measures can constrain this familiar political dynamic, and this Article sketches three strategies as illustrative examples. First, we should make the costs of special interest deals more visible through better budgetary accounting. Second, we should enlist specific institutions within our government to target waste and pork. For example, we should empower special House and Senate committees to cut particular budget items or, alternatively, to sever them from the rest of the budget and subject them to a separate public vote. Third, we should create stronger institutional barriers to deficit spending. Scarcity focuses the mind, so that our leaders will have greater incentive to reject initiatives that are not cost justified. Part I of this Article lays out the relevant economic challenges and calls for a broad agenda to promote economic growth. Part II outlines difficulties and uncertainties with a Keynesian stimulus. Part III surveys a few substantive challenges that require our attention and, as an example, shows the importance of cutting corporate tax rates. Part IV discusses the need to reform our budgetary process.
2. Title: The Regulatory Authority of the Treasury Department to Index Capital Gains for Inflation: A Sequel.
Authors: Cooper, Charles J.; Colatriano, Vincent.
Abstract: The 1992 election witnessed the revival of one of the periodically recurring debates in the field of tax policy—whether the determination of taxable gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset should be “indexed” to reflect the effect of inflation on the taxpayer’s investment. What distinguished that debate from virtually all previous capital gains indexation debates was the overlay of a complex legal question on top of the usual economic and political considerations. Although the indexation debate previously focused almost exclusively on the wisdom of amending the Internal Revenue Code (the Code or I.R.C.) to require indexation, the 1992 debate introduced the legal issue of whether such a statutory amendment was even necessary. Could the Treasury Department (Treasury) simply adopt regulations allowing for capital gains indexation? Consideration of this legal issue obviously implicated intricate questions concerning the meaning of the Code’s capital gains provisions and the deference to which any administrative reinterpretation of those provisions would be entitled in a court challenge. During the summer of 1992, we were asked by the National Chamber Foundation, an affiliate of the United States Chamber of Commerce, to examine this legal issue. After conducting a comprehensive analysis of the Code and its legislative history, as well as of relevant principles of administrative law—with particular emphasis on the “Chevron doctrine”—we concluded that the Treasury would have the regulatory authority to index capital gains without an amendment to the Code. The principal foundation of our analysis was our conclusion that the term “cost” as used in the Code’s capital gains provisions was ambiguous and was not plainly limited to historical cost—that is, the price originally paid for a capital asset. We also concluded that Congress’s failure to enact various proposals that would have amended the Code to provide for indexation, as well as its enactment over the years of various other kinds of capital gains preferences, did not eliminate the ambiguity in the meaning of the pivotal term “cost” in the Code, nor did it otherwise foreclose the Treasury’s ability to provide for indexation through the adoption of regulations. Our memorandum discussing the details of our legal analysis subsequently formed the basis of a law review article on the subject of administrative indexation of capital gains. Though we direct the reader to the VTR article for the details of our comprehensive analysis, we provide a summary of that analysis in Part I of this Article.
3. Title: Judicial Compulsion and the Public Fisc -- A Historical Overview
Authors: Cuccinelli II, Kenneth T.; Getchell Jr., E. Duncan; Russell Jr., Wesley G.
Abstract: On September 13, 2011, the Providence Rhode Island Superior Court denied the State's motion for summary judgment on a claim, brought by a number of public employee unions, asserting that the statutory pension system establishes a contractual relationship between the State of Rhode Island and participating employees sufficient to trigger the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause of the state constitution when benefits to vested employees are statutorily reduced. Undoubtedly this case can be regarded as early thunder from a not so distant storm. The likelihood of litigation arising from alteration of pension benefits has generated interest at both the federal and state levels. In times of fiscal contraction, social welfare benefits might be altered in ways that engender litigation. Guarantees of quality education in state constitutions have produced many suits affecting the public fisc. Historically, the most dramatic fiscal forensic disputes arose from the repudiation of public bonded indebtedness. In Part I, we review the law bearing on actions implicating the public fisc until 1960. In Part II, we give an overview of the law since 1960. In the Conclusion, we discuss why judicial recognition of vested rights in mere legislative provisions might be unwise both for the broader public interest and for the beneficiaries of such legislation regarded as a class.
4. Title: Reducing the Drug War's Damage to Government Budgets
Authors: Kopel, David B.; Burrus, Trevor.
Abstract: Soaring Medicaid costs, reduced tax revenues because of economic stagnation and the collapse of a housing bubble, and enormous expenditures on pensions for retired government employees have imposed severe stress on the budgets of almost every state government. As a result, many states are being forced to cut funding for traditional and important services provided by state governments, such as civil courts that can resolve disputes within a reasonably expeditious time, protection of children from abuse, and protection of the environment. Unlike most state governments, the federal government does not have the fiscal discipline of a balanced budget requirement. As a result, federal debt is now more than $15 trillion, and that figure has been growing by more than a trillion dollars per year for the last four years. The rapidly increasing debt could place the nation on a short path to Greek-style fiscal collapse. Not one U.S. Senator or Representative has proposed a tax increase that would, in itself, result in a balanced budget; indeed, a trillion dollar tax increase probably would drive the economy into a deep recession. So regardless of whether tax increases are a good idea, the need to cut at least some federal spending is clear. Because states and the federal government must trim nonessential programs to preserve the essential ones, it is time for states and the federal government to consider drug law reform. In this Essay, we make no philosophical arguments about drug prohibition. Rather, we identify several specific reforms that would reduce the fiscal costs of the “War on Drugs.”
5. Title: Papers, Please: Does the Constitution Permit the States a Role in Immigration Enforcement?
Authors: Eastman, John C.
Abstract: Arizona kicked up quite a dust storm in 2010 when it enacted Senate Bill 1070 (S.B. 1070). Proponents hoped the law would help Arizona control the burgeoning illegal immigration into the state and its attendant costs—costs that affect the financial stability of the state, the safety of its residents, and the very rule of law itself. The legal professoriate almost uniformly derided Arizona’s new law as an unconstitutional usurpation of immigration policy—an area that the Constitution assigns exclusively to the federal government. In particular, commentators targeted Section 2 of the law, which requires police officers to verify the immigration status of anyone who is lawfully detained, contending that it is patently unconstitutional under Hines v. Davidowitz and would require racial profiling. Critics similarly derided Alabama’s new immigration law, particularly Section 28 of the Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, which requires every public elementary and secondary school in the state to determine if an enrolling student is lawfully present in the United States. Critics contended that the law ran afoul of the 1982 case of Plyler v. Doe, in which the Supreme Court held that denying free public school education to illegal immigrants violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of equal protection. This Essay explores the legal challenges to the two statutes, addresses how the Department of Justice (DOJ) fundamentally misunderstands the nature of state sovereignty and federalism, and concludes that, with the possible exception of one provision of the Arizona law, the states are acting well within their authority to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their residents without intruding on the plenary power over immigration and naturalization that the U.S. Constitution vests in Congress.
6. Title: Its Hour Come Round at Last? State Sovereign Immunity and the Great State Debt Crisis of the Early Twenty-First Century.
Authors: Young, Ernest A.
Abstract: The current Court’s state sovereign immunity jurisprudence suffers from significant internal confusion and a barrage of external criticism. I argue in this Essay that much of the problem arises from the Court’s effort to decouple the doctrine of state sovereign immunity from the practical imperatives that have historically enjoined recourse to it. Sovereign immunity is one of the Constitution’s austerity mechanisms: It rarely allows governments to avoid their obligations entirely, but it does confer a degree of discretion on government officials as to how and when they will comply with those obligations. But our constitutional culture does not easily tolerate departures from the principle that rights require remedies, and the strong medicine of sovereign immunity generally will lack legitimacy in the absence of compelling public need. Ironically, the Rehnquist Court’s revival of state sovereign immunity might simply have come fifteen years too soon. As a result of both the “Great Recession” of the last several years and, perhaps more importantly, long term mismanagement of pension and healthcare obligations, the states are once more in crisis. According to Michael Greve, “Deficits for the current budget cycle are estimated at $175 billion. In some states (Texas, California, Nevada, and Illinois), the shortfall exceeds 30 percent of projected budgets. The long term picture is considerably worse: “Unfunded pension obligations are estimated at upwards of $1 trillion and are probably three or four times that amount. Unfunded health care commitments clock in at upwards of a half trillion. Bond debt issued by state and local governments comes in around $2.8 trillion.”13 These developments raise an obvious question: What role will state sovereign immunity play in this new crisis? Part I of this Essay traces the history of sovereign immunity and state debt, demonstrating that, historically, legal actors have tied state sovereign immunity closely to protecting the fiscal health of the States while relaxing immunity rules where necessary to permit the enforcement of federal law in contexts that do not threaten the public fisc. I offer this account as a stab at understanding the overall shape of the Supreme Court’s immunity doctrine, but I cannot hope to run that claim to ground in this brief Essay. It will be enough if I can point the way toward a more fruitful understanding. Part II addresses the disjuncture between sovereign immunity and fiscal crisis in the Rehnquist Court’s state sovereign immunity jurisprudence and speculates that this disconnect has undermined both the coherence and the legitimacy of the Court’s doctrine. In Part III, I speculate as to how state sovereign immunity will help shape the law’s response to the States’ current fiscal crisis.
7. Title: Judicial Selection Reconsidered: A Plea for Radical Moderation.
Authors: Geyh, Charles Gardner.
Abstract: In this Essay, I argue that it is no longer credible to contend that judges simply declare what the law is without regard to what they think the law should be. In difficult cases, judicial decisionmaking requires discretion that inevitably brings legal and extralegal considerations to bear. Conceding that judges are policymakers in some sense of the term, however, does not mean that judges are undeserving of independence denied public officials in the political branches. What judges do is different from what other public officials do in ways that justify a measure of autonomy for a quasi-legal, quasi-political judiciary. The net effect of these differences is to make the judge a unique kind of occasional policymaker, who does not represent a constituency in the same way as elected officials in the other branches. Whether those differences warrant independence from the electorate in periodic elections is context-dependent, which helps explain why debate over the optimal system of judicial selection is inevitable, perpetual, and, in the minds of some, hopeless. Thinking about judicial selection with reference to the justifications for judicial independence developed here enables us to get past unproductive, all-or-nothing arguments about whether judges should be elected or appointed and instead isolate three core threats to independence so as to focus the debate: judicial reselection, real or perceived dependence on campaign supporters, and candidate precommitments. I conclude with some thoughts on how to remedy these problems incrementally, without resorting to all-or-nothing arguments.
8. Title: Contesting the Judicial Power in the States.
Authors: Tarr, G. Alan
Abstract: Scott Gerber's A Distinct Judicial Power brilliantly traces the development of the Article III model of an independent judiciary from its colonial origins to the Philadelphia Convention. Although Article III defines the federal courts, few states today fully embrace that model. Article III guarantees federal judges tenure during good behavior, but only Massachusetts and New Hampshire follow the federal example. Article III establishes a system of presidential appointment and senatorial confirmation, but only California, Maine, New Hampshire, and New Jersey use a system of executive appointment with confirmation by another body, and even those state processes vary somewhat from the Article III model. For example, in California the appointed judges run in periodic retention elections, while in New Jersey they serve a term of 7 years after which they must be reappointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate to serve to the retirement age of 70. Finally, Article III protects federal judges against reduction in their salaries, but some states permit such reductions as long as they are part of an across the board reduction of the salaries of state officials or prohibit raising the salaries of sitting judges as well as lowering them. Differences in the status of Article III judges and their state counterparts are not new. States have charted their own paths, looking more to the practices in sister states than to the federal system. During the eighteenth century, several states introduced removal by address, under which judges could be removed from office without trial by vote of the state legislature. During the nineteenth century, most states instituted partisan election of judges and reduced their tenure. And during the twentieth century, some states introduced the recall of judges, some instituted nonpartisan election of judges, and others adopted “merit selection” of judges—a system under which the governor appoints from a list of candidates selected by a purportedly neutral judicial selection commission. This Essay traces the states’ efforts to define the “distinct judicial power” in the decades after independence and the adoption of the Federal Constitution. The contours of that power were contested for much of the antebellum era as debates raged over the role of the judiciary in a republican polity. Two issues dominated that debate: from whom should judges be independent and what should be the scope of their responsibilities? Only after consensus was reached on these issues could discussion begin about what influences impinged on the performance of that function.
9. Title: If Men Were Angels.
Authors: Casto, William R.
Abstract: In The Federalist, James Madison wrote, with characteristic elegance and insight: If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. Scott Gerber's A Distinct Judicial Power is a wonderful exploration of one of Madison's auxiliary precautions. Professor Gerber traces the evolution of the concept of separation of powers from Aristotle to the creation of the Federal Constitution. In particular, Professor Gerber considers the idea of a judicial branch of government independent from the other branches. The major part of his analysis carefully explores the development of an independent judiciary in each of the original colonies and states. James Madison surely saw an independent judiciary as one of the auxiliary precautions necessary to control the governments exercise of power, but, to him independence was simply a means to an end. One of the Constitutions primary structural precautions against misuse of government power is the separation of powers. If the judiciary is to operate as an effective check on the legislative and the executive branches, the judiciary must have some measure of insulation from the enormous power wielded by the other two branches of government. In the book’s concluding chapter, Professor Gerber takes up the issue of judicial review and convincingly details the relationship between judicial independence and the power to enforce a constitution by nullifying unconstitutional actions. The power of judicial review is an important aspect of constitutional governance, but our modern preoccupation with this power can obscure other, perhaps more important, benefits of judicial independence.
10. Title: Concluding Thoughts from Ada, Ohio.
Authors: Gerber, Scott Douglas.
Abstract: A recent issue of the Journal of Legal Education contains an impressive empirical study that most law professors can confirm without the use of the complicated “network analysis” employed by the study’s authors: Both law faculty hiring and how quickly new paradigms of legal scholarship suffuse the academy turn in no small part on whether the candidate trying to land a top law school teaching job or the proponents of the legal movement attended Harvard or Yale. That is what makes it so remarkable that a Symposium was convened at Harvard Law School on March 29, 2011, to discuss the issues of judicial independence raised in a new book by a law professor from Ohio Northern University. That the commentators included such academic luminaries as Steven G. Calabresi, William R. Casto, Charles G. Geyh, Stephen B. Presser, Jed H. Shugerman, G. Alan Tarr, and Mark V. Tushnet compels me to try to explain, albeit briefly, how this could have occurred and why it matters that it did.
11. Title: Against Liability for Private Risk-Exposure.
Authors: Scheuerman, Sheila B.
Abstract: Though it is not unusual for highprofile product incidents to result in mass litigation, what is notable about the claims against Toyota is that many of the plaintiff vehicle owners seeking damages for SUA never actually experienced a SUA problem. Nor did they allege that they suffered emotional harm, distress or anxiety caused by the perceived risk that their Toyota might experience SUA. To those unfamiliar with this type of litigation, the Toyota cases might prompt an obvious question: Can a plaintiff who has not yet suffered an injury sue based on the risk of future harm? One would think this question is easily settled. As Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit famously stated, [n]o injury, no tort. And indeed, many courts have rejected these suits on grounds ranging from lack of constitutional standing to lack of causation. Yet the courts are intractably divided over whether these no injury or unmanifested defect suits are cognizable. This conflict has created incentives for forum-shopping as plaintiffs search for a jurisdiction friendly to no injury lawsuits and class certification. Numerous manufacturing industries, including automobiles, beds, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices, have faced claims for damages now based on allegations that their products might malfunction in the future. This Article attempts to clear the confusion surrounding these claims. Stripped to their core, these no injury lawsuits permit plaintiffs to pursue private tort and warranty claims based on mere exposure to risk. As I explain, however, such a fundamental change is not justified by either economic or moral rationales. Rather, I argue that manifested harm is an essential element of tort and warranty claims and thus these no injury cases should be rejected.
12. Title: A Farewell to Harms: Against Presuming Irreparable Injury in Constitutional Litigation.
Authors: Disarro, Anthony.
Abstract: Although irreparable injury is an essential element to obtaining injunctive relief, most federal circuit courts have held that irreparable injury should be presumed in constitutional cases. Thus, the ability of a plaintiff to secure an injunction against a claimed violation of the Constitution frequently turns on whether she has made a sufficient showing of the probability of success on the merits of her constitutional claim. The Supreme Court disapproved of the practice of presuming irreparable harm for federal statutory claims but has not addressed the issue with respect to constitutional claims. A few circuit courts, sensing that the Court will not endorse a blanket presumption, opted to limit the presumption to certain constitutional claims. This Article argues that the presumption should be eliminated altogether. The history of the injunctive remedy in this country and in England, from which we inherited our equity law, reflects a consistent and unyielding view that irreparable injury is an essential element of proof. The Supreme Court has never suggested that courts should approach the question of injunctive relief differently in constitutional cases and has repeatedly emphasized the irreparable injury element in that context. The Court has further stated that, although constitutional rights are important, they do not warrant any relaxation of the traditional requirements for obtaining remedies. Courts should not presume damages for constitutional wrongs; why then should they presume irreparable harm? Conclusive presumptions can be justified on the ground that they save judicial time and resources by eliminating needless litigation over matters that are incontrovertible or self-evident, but the existence and extent of harm from constitutional infractions is not guaranteed, even for purposes of standing to sue.
13. Title: Stare Decisis in an Originalist Congress.
Authors: Alicea, Joel.
Abstract: Part I briefly reviews the literature on originalist extrajudicial constitutional interpretation as well as the scholarship on legislative stare decisis. Part II examines five common arguments for adherence to precedent in a judicial setting and analyzes their salience in an originalist legislative context. Finally, the Conclusion looks back on the analysis in Part II and offers a view about the relevance of stare decisis for an originalist Congress that seeks to take constitutional interpretation seriously. This Note argues that stare decisis matters a great deal less for an originalist Congress than it does for the Supreme Court. Although that answer might not surprise many, what is surprising is that there remain good arguments for giving at least a modicum of respect to precedent in the originalist legislative context. As it is with originalism generally, so it is with legislative precedents: “We will have the dead at our councils."
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