ÐÏà¡±á>þÿ ˆŠþÿÿÿ†‡ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿì¥ÁU ðR¿ìlbjbjënën2‚‰éa‰éaÉ3 ÿÿÿÿÿÿ·""ÿÿÿÿÁÁÁ8ùœ•Á„Rl±±±±±åååQ!Q!Q!Q!Q!Q!Q$ðS¶¦V<�EQùåååååEQ±±4>R===å:±±Q=åQ===±ÿÿÿÿŠá/üOÔÿÿÿÿ(=QTR0„R=âVGFâV==þ/âV;NÐåå=åååååEQEQ°ååå„RååååÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿâVååååååååå"Qs: Governance Volume 31, Issue 4, October 2018 1. Title: Power and changing modes of governance in the euro crisis Authors: Martin B. Carstensen; Vivien A. Schmidt. Abstract: Which European Union actors are most powerful in the governance of the euro crisis? The euro crisis has reignited the classic debate between intergovernmentalists, who tend to stress the coercive power of dominant member states in the European Council, and supranationalists, who maintain that through the use of institutional power, the Commission, and the European Central Bank turned out the “winners” of the crisis. This article argues that euro crisis governance is best understood not just in terms of one form of power but instead as evolving through different constellations of coercive, institutional, and ideational power that favored different EU actors over the course of the crisis, from the initial fast burning phase (2010 2012), where the coercive and ideational power of Northern European member states in the European Council was strongest, to the slow burning phase (2012 2016), when greater influence was afforded supranational actors through the use of ideational and institutional power. 2. Title: It is all about value: How domestic party brands influence voting patterns in the European Parliament Authors: Anna M. Meyerrose Abstract: Research on the European Parliament finds legislative voting patterns remained constant following the Eastern enlargement of the European Union. This article shows that Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from these new member states are actually more likely to vote along European party lines. Given that these MEPs often come from less institutionalized domestic party systems that lack norms of legislative discipline, we should expect them to exhibit more erratic voting behavior than MEPs from mature systems. Why would stronger party discipline at the European level be associated with more volatile and fragmented domestic party systems? This article argues MEPs from less institutionalized systems rely more on the brand of their European party, which provides better information and career opportunities than their parties at home, and thus are more likely to vote along European party lines. I find support for this theory using data from the sixth European Parliament (2004–2009). 3. Title: Exaggerating good governance: Regime type and score inflation among executive survey informants Authors: Bethany Shockley; Michael Ewers; Yioryos Nardis; Justin Gengler. Abstract: Researchers and policymakers often rely on executive surveys to understand and promote good governance. In doing so, they assume that the evaluations provided by these well informed respondents are not systematically influenced by regime type. However, regime embedded executives often have a personal stake in the survey outcomes, incentivizing them to exaggerate good governance. This paper compares World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey responses to corollary measures of key governance concepts in democracies, anocracies, and autocracies. It finds evidence of significant score inflation among executives in closed regimes. The individual level mechanisms are explored in one autocracy by comparing responses from regime embedded informants based at firms headquartered within the country with those managing businesses headquartered abroad. These micro level data likewise reveal evidence of widespread inflation, particularly on items related to governance. Finally, a closer look at Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index demonstrates the broader impact Executive Opinion Survey inflation for measuring governance within closed regimes. 4. Title: Making local government work better: How local and internationally sponsored institutions interact to influence performance in Bosnia Herzegovina Authors: Paula M. Pickering; Mirna Jusi. Abstract: Why has international investment into reforming local governance in post conflict societies produced mixed results? Drawing on new institutionalism, the authors expect reform outcomes, even of comprehensive assistance, to be shaped by the interaction between new and old rules, an interaction mediated by local elites. This expectation is explored in three pairs of comparable municipalities in Bosnia Herzegovina. Using data collected through field research and an original index of local government performance, we find that most municipalities achieved incremental improvements in performance between 2005 and 2010. Differences can be explained by the varying endurance of old informal rules that antagonistically coexist with and undermine internationally proposed rules, as well as by the varying strength of local opponents of reform. The implication is that more effective promotion of local government performance requires more attention to and a long term approach to minimizing the constraints posed by informal rules and local actors opposed to reform. 5. Title: Gender, actors, and institutions at the local level: Explaining variation in policies to address violence against women and girls Authors: Francesca Gains; Vivien Lowndes. Abstract: Research on gender equality policy has generally focused on actors and institutions at the national and international levels. This article considers the role of local level actors and institutions in explaining different policy responses to violence against women and girls (VAWG). The literature on gender policy trajectories identifies the particular importance of executive actors in influencing “status policies” like VAWG. Quantitative data are analyzed to show how local Police and Crime Commissioners in England and Wales have responded to demands for policy action. The focus is on the interaction between the 41 elected commissioners and the new institutional arrangements for police governance introduced in 2012. The article shows that variation in policy outcomes is related (a) to the gender of executive actors and (b) to the way in which actors interpret elements of the institutional framework, regardless of their own gender. 6. Title: Pork is policy: Dissipative inclusion at the local level Authors: Frederico Bertholini; Carlos Pereira; Lucio Renno. Abstract: The article investigates the impact of local policies on human development indicators in Brazilian municipalities. This is an attempt to investigate the role of the legislative branch in reducing inequality and poverty through budget amendments, usually seen in derogatory form as pork barrel politics. We assess the effect of pork on municipalities using up to date policy evaluation techniques. Brazil is a case of extreme inequality and an active legislative branch in disbursing monies. The data set contains over 60,000 observations from all 5,500+ Brazilian municipalities for over a decade. We use matching and longitudinal data analysis techniques, treating pork as exogenous shocks, mapping how its effect reverberates on social and economic indicators in succeeding years. The results indicate a positive impact of such policies in improving local level development. However, these results are not sustainable over time, thus suggesting inclusion with a dissipative profile. 7. Title: Recognition of innovation and diffusion of welfare policy: Alleviating urban poverty in Chinese cities during fiscal recentralization Authors: Xufeng Zhu; Hui Zhao. Abstract: This article explores the complicated triangular architecture among innovation diffusion, fiscal recentralization, and authoritarian welfare regimes. We argue that local governments' adoption of innovative welfare policies attracts the attention of central authorities who tend to recognize spontaneous local innovation by releasing central administrative signals. During the era of fiscal recentralization starting from the Chinese Tax Sharing System Reform in 1994, cities with higher fiscal dependency are more likely to behave innovatively by adopting a new welfare policy for potential fiscal transfer rewards. The central government's recognition of this innovation stimulates cities' adoption but would reverse the effects of fiscal dependency because of the loss of the “innovativeness” of the adoption and its effectiveness in attracting the attention of superior authorities. We test our theories on the dynamic diffusion with the case of China's Urban Minimum Living Standard Assistance system, an urban poverty alleviation policy implemented fully in 1999. 8. Title: The power of process: State capacity and climate policy Authors: Jonas Meckling; Jonas Nahm. Abstract: State capacity is central to the provision of public goods, including environmental protection. Drawing on climate policy making, this article argues that the division of labor between the bureaucracy and legislature in policy formulation is a critical source of state capacity. In cases of bureaucratic policy design, the legislature sets policy goals and delegates policy design to bureaucracies. This division of labor shifts distributional conflict to autonomous bureaucracies, allowing for effective policy design. California followed this path in climate policy making, setting it on track to meet climate goals. In cases of legislative policy design, bureaucracies set goals and legislatures design policy measures. Since legislators have incentives to respond to vested interests, legislative policy design is vulnerable to regulatory capture. In Germany, legislative policy design in climate policy making is preventing attainment of emissions reduction goals, as industry interests succeeded in blocking key policy measures. Our findings highlight procedural sources of state capacity. 9. Title: From quiescent bureaucracy to “undocumented wonder”: Explaining the Indian Election Commission's expanding mandate Authors: Amit Ahuja; Susan L. Ostermann. Abstract: Public institutions in the developing world are often characterized by institutional capture or decay. Yet, India's Election Commission (EC) has become one of its most powerful regulatory bodies. We use a process &)*+,-/8qrzíÜÊ¹Ê¹Ê¹ª™ˆtl_QC6QhjŒ5OJQJ^Jo(h¬‰h¬‰5OJQJ^JhÌ"èhU<¬5OJQJ^Jh·uD5OJQJ^Jo(hÌ"èhÌ"èo(&hÌ"èhÌ"è5CJOJQJ^JaJo( h;I85CJOJQJ^JaJo( hUL5CJOJQJ^JaJo(h 2e5CJOJQJ^JaJ h¬‰5CJOJQJ^JaJo(#hÌ"èhÌ"è5CJOJQJ^JaJ h$-Ó5CJOJQJ^JaJo(#h¬‰h¬‰5CJOJQJ^JaJ,-.r¤%&–±¡¢Vôõ>’ö"ø"$d$ë(ì(÷÷òíííèèãããèÞÞÞèÙÙÙÔÏÏÔÔgdÐpsgd)w¤gd$?ÃgdToŸgdßl$gd%j,gdU<¬gdÌ"è$a$gdt4z{‘¢£¤®2 4 $%&')/0•–žŸôæÙæÙÌ¾°™™™sh[¾M[æ=M[hvI¼hßl$5OJQJ^Jo(hßl$hßl$5OJQJ^Jhßl$5OJQJ^Jo(hjŒ5OJQJo(hiht4OJQJ^Jo(/h¬‰B*OJQJ^JfHo(phqÊ ÿÿÿÿ,h¬‰B*OJQJ^JfHphqÊ ÿÿÿÿhihjŒOJQJ^Jo(hÌ"èhU<¬5OJQJ^Jht45OJQJ^Jo(h¬‰5OJQJ^Jo(h¬‰h¬‰5OJQJ^Jhicy5OJQJ^JŸ°±º» ¡¢£¤¥«¬%&45DETUV_ñáÓÅ® •ˆzseˆñUeˆñHñHñHñHUeh¬‰5OJQJ^Jo(hvI¼hToŸ5OJQJ^Jo(hToŸhToŸ5OJQJ^JhToŸhToŸhÌ"èhÒ`Œ5OJQJ^JhToŸ5OJQJ^Jo(h%j,5OJQJo(hihU<¬OJQJ^Jo(,h¬‰B*OJQJ^JfHphqÊ ÿÿÿÿhihßl$OJQJ^Jo(hßl$hßl$5OJQJ^JhvI¼hßl$5OJQJ^Jo(h¬‰h¬‰5OJQJ^J_`ÆÈÖØz|„†óôõöøþÿ<>NPtñÚÂÚÂÚÂÚÂÚÂÚµªtdTtFh¬‰h¬‰5OJQJ^JhvI¼h$?Ã5OJQJ^Jo(h¬‰h¬‰5OJQJ^Jo(h$?Ã5OJQJ^Jo(h$?Ãh$?Ã5OJQJ^JhÌ"èh%j,5OJQJ^Jhs/Ê5OJQJ^Jo(h%j,5OJQJo(hihaNOJQJ^J/h¬‰B*OJQJ^JfHo(phqÊ ÿÿÿÿ,h¬‰B*OJQJ^JfHphqÊ ÿÿÿÿh»)hToŸOJQJ^Jo(tvŽ’¤¦68ÈÊ$"&"ô"ö"ø"ú"þ" ##$$ $óåóÕÇ¹¢Š¢Š¢Š¢|qdVHdå:HhvI¼hÐps5OJQJ^JhÐpshÐps5OJQJ^JhÌ"èh)w¤5OJQJ^JhÐps5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hvI¼h%j,OJQJ^Jo(/h&h‡B*OJQJ^JfHo(phqÊ ÿÿÿÿ,h&h‡B*OJQJ^JfHphqÊ ÿÿÿÿh»)h$?ÃOJQJ^Jo(h$?Ãh$?Ã5OJQJ^JhvI¼h$?Ã5OJQJ^Jo(h¬‰h¬‰5OJQJ^Jh¬‰5OJQJ^Jo( $"$@$B$`$b$d$v$x$Ä%Æ%ê(ë(ì(í(ï(õ(ö(óåØåØÈº¬•}•odWI;Whr7Ahr7A5OJQJ^JhÌ"èh)w¤5OJQJ^Jhr7A5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hvI¼h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(/h&h‡B*OJQJ^JfHo(phqÊ ÿÿÿÿ,h&h‡B*OJQJ^JfHphqÊ ÿÿÿÿh}Onh)w¤OJQJ^Jo(h$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(h&h‡5OJQJ^Jo(h¬‰h¬‰5OJQJ^JhÐps5OJQJ^Jo(ö(.)/)7)8)L)M)\)])i)j)k)t)u)ê*u,M.N.O.P.R.ñãÕÇñºñºñºªœŽseZM?hÌ"èh)w¤5OJQJ^Jh|ÿ5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hvI¼h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(h&h‡h&h‡OJQJ^Jo(h&h‡h&h‡OJQJ^Jh}Onh)w¤OJQJ^Jo(h$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(h&h‡5OJQJ^Jo(hvI¼hvI¼5OJQJ^Jhr7Ahr7A5OJQJ^JhvI¼hr7A5OJQJ^Jh&h‡h&h‡5OJQJ^Jì(/)k)N.O.ß.þ.j4l4ð4:5ï9ð9m:–:ÆYÈYÂZêZêbìbúbüb¼cìcædúúõõððõõëëõõææõõááõõÜõ××õgdóSågd[gdÿ_gdLz¥gd)ggd|ÿgd)w¤gdr7AR.X.Y.Þ.ß.è.ò.ó.ü.ý.þ.//x1z144h4j4l4n4ñäÖÈñÖ»Ö»«x`x`xRG:h)g5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hvI¼h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(/h&h‡B*OJQJ^JfHo(phqÊ ÿÿÿÿ,h&h‡B*OJQJ^JfHphqÊ ÿÿÿÿh}Onh)w¤OJQJ^Jo(h$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(h&h‡5OJQJ^Jo(hvI¼h|ÿ5OJQJ^Jh&h‡h&h‡5OJQJ^Jh|ÿ5OJQJ^Jo(h|ÿh|ÿ5OJQJ^Jn4r4~4€4î4ð4555 56585:5L5N5î9ï9ð9ñ9ó9ù9ñãÖÈºãÖÈÈj\QDñ6hLz¥hLz¥5OJQJ^JhR5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hvI¼h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(,h&h‡B*OJQJ^JfHphqÊ ÿÿÿÿhih)w¤OJQJ^Jo(h$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(h&h‡5OJQJ^Jo(hvI¼h)g5OJQJ^Jh&h‡h&h‡5OJQJ^Jh)g5OJQJ^Jo(h)gh)g5OJQJ^JhÌ"èh)w¤5OJQJ^Jù9ú9l:m:v:€::”:•:–:Ÿ: :<�TTVUXUBYDYÄYÆYÈYÌYóå×Éå¼å¼¬žyw_y_y_yQF9hR5OJQJ^Jo(h)w¤5OJQJo(hvI¼h)w¤OJQJ^Jo(/h&h‡B*OJQJ^JfHo(phqÊ ÿÿÿÿU,h&h‡B*OJQJ^JfHphqÊ ÿÿÿÿhih)w¤OJQJ^Jo(h$?Ãh)w¤5OJQJ^JhvI¼h)w¤5OJQJ^Jo(h&h‡5OJQJ^Jo(hLz¥hLz¥5OJQJ^JhvI¼hLz¥5OJQJ^Jh&h‡h&h‡5OJQJ^JhLz¥5OJQJ^Jo( tracing approach to explain the EC's surprising expansion of mandate, arguing that in a federal democracy: (a) when institutional constraints are weakened, (b) when state based actors demand a competent and neutral arbiter, and (c) when entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advantage of moments of political opportunity, those aspects of the bureaucracy that can credibly meet these demands are able to successfully expand their powers. Changes in Model Code Implementation and Election Duration attest to the EC's broader role. The EC's experience suggests that a weak executive can facilitate the strengthening of state institutions and that, under federalism, state based electoral forces can produce strong national institutions. 10. Title: Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies Authors: Don S. Lee Abstract: How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis à vis the legislature. åNN/ffNÄ‹ÿ 11. Title: Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation By Aila M. Matanock Authors: Emily Beaulieu Abstract: The article reviews the book Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation, by Aila M.Matanock. 12. Title: Power in Modern Russia: Strategy and Mobilisation By Andrew Monaghan Authors: Alasdair Roberts Abstract: The article reviews the book Power in Modern Russia: Strategy and Mobilisation, by Andrew Monaghan. 13. Title: Shaping Policy in India: Alliance, Advocacy, Activism By Rajesh Chakrabarti, Kaushiki Sanyal Authors: Sudha Pai Abstract: The article reviews the book Shaping Policy in India: Alliance, Advocacy, Activism, by Rajesh Chakrabarti and Kaushiki Sanyal. 14. Title: Meta Regulation in Practice: Beyond Normative Views of Morality and Rationality By F. C. Simon Authors: Tony Prosser Abstract: The article reviews the book Meta Regulation in Practice: Beyond Normative Views of Morality and Rationality, by F. C.Simon. 15. Title: California Greenin : How the Golden State Became an Environmental Leader By David Vogel Authors: Michael E. Kraft Abstract: The article reviews the book California Greenin : How the Golden State Became an Environmental Leader, by David Vogel. 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